Can India Reset Ties with a BNP-Led Bangladesh?

In a congratulatory message posted in Bengali, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed BNP leader Tarique Rahman’s “decisive victory” and pledged India’s support for a “democratic, progressive and inclusive” neighbour. He said he looked forward to working closely with Dhaka to strengthen the two countries’ “multifaceted relationship”.

The tone was forward-looking, but cautious. Since Sheikh Hasina fled to India following the Gen Z-led uprising of July 2024, relations between the two neighbours have frayed, with mistrust hardening on both sides. Hasina’s Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest political party, was barred from contesting the election.

Many Bangladeshis accuse New Delhi of backing an increasingly authoritarian Hasina, adding to long-standing grievances over border killings, water-sharing disputes, trade barriers and provocative political rhetoric. Visa services have largely been suspended, cross-border train and bus services halted, and flights between Dhaka and Delhi sharply reduced.

For New Delhi, the question is no longer whether to engage a BNP-led government, but how. India wants to safeguard its red lines on insurgency and extremism, while also cooling domestic political rhetoric that has increasingly turned Bangladesh into a political talking point.

A reset is possible, analysts say, but it will require restraint and reciprocity.

“The BNP is the most politically experienced and moderate among the main parties and remains India’s safest bet going forward,” says Avinash Paliwal, who teaches politics and international studies at SOAS University of London. “The real question is how Tarique Rahman governs. He is clearly seeking to stabilise India–Bangladesh ties, but that is easier said than done.”

For India, the BNP is not an unknown entity. When the party returned to power in 2001 under Tarique Rahman’s mother, Khaleda Zia, in alliance with the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, relations with India cooled rapidly. That period was marked by turbulence and deep mutual mistrust.

Despite early gestures of goodwill – India’s then national security adviser Brajesh Mishra was the first foreign dignitary to congratulate Khaleda Zia – trust remained thin. The BNP’s ease in maintaining relations with Washington, Beijing and Islamabad fuelled Delhi’s suspicion that Dhaka was drifting strategically.

Two of India’s key red lines were soon tested: preventing support for insurgent groups in India’s north-east and ensuring the protection of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh.

Post-election attacks on Hindus in districts such as Bhola and Jessore alarmed New Delhi. More damaging was the April 2004 seizure of 10 truckloads of weapons in Chittagong – the largest arms haul in Bangladesh’s history – allegedly bound for Indian rebel groups. Economic ties also struggled. A proposed $3 billion investment by India’s Tata Group stalled over gas pricing and eventually collapsed in 2008.

Relations continued to deteriorate. In 2014, Khaleda Zia, then in opposition, cancelled a scheduled meeting with then Indian President Pranab Mukherjee, citing security concerns – a move widely seen in Delhi as a diplomatic snub.

This uneasy history partly explains why India later invested so heavily in Sheikh Hasina.

During her 15 years in power, Hasina delivered what New Delhi valued most in its neighbourhood: strong security cooperation against insurgents, improved connectivity, and a government broadly aligned with India rather than China. The partnership was strategically valuable for Delhi, even as it proved politically costly for Dhaka.

Now living in exile in India, Hasina faces a death sentence in absentia over the 2024 security crackdown. The United Nations says about 1,400 people were killed, most by security forces. India’s refusal to extradite her has further complicated any attempt at a reset with Dhaka.

Last month, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar travelled to Dhaka for Khaleda Zia’s funeral and met Tarique Rahman on the sidelines. At a recent rally, the BNP leader declared: “Not Delhi, not Rawalpindi – Bangladesh before everything,” signalling an intent to keep distance from both India and Pakistan’s military establishment.

Pakistan remains a sensitive factor in the regional equation. After Hasina’s fall, Dhaka moved quickly to improve ties with Islamabad. A direct Dhaka–Karachi flight resumed last month after a 14-year break. Earlier, Pakistan’s foreign minister visited Bangladesh for the first time in 13 years. Senior military officials have exchanged visits, security cooperation is back on the table, and bilateral trade rose by 27 per cent in 2024–25.

The optics are hard to miss: a once-frosty relationship is thawing.

“What concerns us is not that Bangladesh has ties with Pakistan – as a sovereign country it is entitled to,” says Smruti Pattanaik of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. “What was unusual was the near absence of engagement during Hasina’s tenure. The pendulum had swung too far in one direction. Now it risks swinging too far in the other.”

Hasina’s continued exile is another major irritant. Pattanaik says the BNP will have to reckon with the reality that her repatriation is unlikely. At the same time, opposition parties in Dhaka are expected to pressure the government to demand her return – one of the few foreign policy levers available to challenge the BNP.

Thousands of Awami League supporters have reportedly crossed into India since the July 2024 uprising. Sreeradha Datta of OP Jindal Global University warns that any attempt by Delhi to rehabilitate the Awami League from Indian soil could further inflame tensions.

Unless Hasina signals contrition or steps aside to allow a leadership transition, Datta says, her continued political presence from exile risks complicating ties.

Another friction point is cross-border rhetoric. Inflammatory commentary by Indian politicians and television studios has reinforced a perception in Bangladesh that Delhi views its neighbour less as an equal sovereign partner and more as a pliant backyard. Recent controversies, including the barring of a Bangladeshi cricketer from the Indian Premier League, have added to resentment.

As Paliwal notes, the “new normal” will depend on whether Dhaka’s new leadership can contain anti-India sentiment and whether New Delhi can tone down its own charged messaging. Failure on either side, he says, will keep the relationship locked in a state of “managed rivalry”.

Security cooperation, however, remains the ballast in an otherwise choppy relationship. India and Bangladesh conduct annual military exercises, coordinated naval patrols and defence dialogues. New Delhi also operates a $500 million line of credit for Bangladesh’s defence purchases.

“I don’t think the BNP will roll back that cooperation,” Pattanaik says. “This is a new leadership, a different coalition, and a party returning to power after 17 years.”

Despite the turbulence, geography and economics continue to bind the two neighbours. The two countries share a 4,096-kilometre border and deep security and cultural ties. Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, while India has become Bangladesh’s biggest export market in Asia.

Estrangement is not a viable option. But the frayed relationship still demands a careful reset.

“India’s past relationship with the BNP is complex and marked more by mistrust than understanding,” says Paliwal. “But in today’s geopolitical context, the fact that Rahman has shown political maturity by not allowing the past to become the enemy of the future, and that Delhi is open to pragmatic engagement, are promising signs.”

The key question is who moves first.

“India should take the initiative as the bigger neighbour,” says Datta. “Bangladesh has held a robust election. Now engage, see where we can help. I am hopeful the BNP has learnt from the past.”

In the end, the reset may depend less on diplomatic rhetoric and more on whether the bigger neighbour chooses confidence over caution.

By Soutik Biswas | India Correspondent, BBC